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Abortion laws in the Republic of  Ireland and Northern Ireland have recently undergone radical reform.
This occurred following a 2018 referendum in the Republic and the passing of  the Northern Ireland
(Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 in Northern Ireland. In both jurisdictions, these legal changes are the
products not only of  moments of  constitutional and legislative action or of  litigation, but of  decades of
feminist protest and strategising that both generated and exploited moments of  legal opportunity. In this
article, drawing on a 2018 workshop and qualitative interviews with feminist activists, we focus attention
on what we call the ‘feminist law work’ involved in reform, highlighting the role of  non-lawyer activists in
achieving legal change in instrumental, creative, emotional, and laborious ways. We argue that ‘feminist law
work’ should be taken seriously as a highly skilled and indispensable driving force in formal legal change
processes.
Keywords: abortion; activism; law reform; legal change; feminist law work; feminist legal
studies; Ireland; Northern Ireland
Interviewer: If  I had to ask you, right now, what’s going on – what are you doing
to change the law [on abortion], what would your answer be?
Kellie O’Dowd (activist, Alliance for Choice): What are we not doing?
Over the last two years, the law on access to abortion has changed substantially in bothjurisdictions on the island of  Ireland. In the Republic of  Ireland, the 8th Amendment
to the Constitution was repealed and replaced with a constitutional provision permitting the
Oireachtas to regulate the termination of  pregnancy, which was achieved with the Health
(Regulation of  Termination of  Pregnancy) Act 2018. In Northern Ireland, abortion was
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decriminalised in 2019,1 and is now legally available pursuant to new regulations introduced
in 2020.2 In both cases, the changes were brought about by particular legal ‘events’ –
constitutional referendum, legislative change, the passage of  regulations – but those events
were preceded by decades of  feminist activism and agitation,3 including substantial amounts
of  what we term ‘feminist law work’.4 This is work that takes place alongside, and
sometimes against, more formalised law work and activity undertaken by voluntary and
non-governmental organisations. It is apposite, now, to reflect on the dynamics of  legal
change in abortion law reform in Ireland and, particularly, to attend to and recognise the
role that feminist law work has played in bringing that change about. 
As explained further below, the term ‘feminist law work’ is intended to capture the
manifold ways in which non-lawyer feminist activists engage with law, legal mobilisation,
legal consciousness, legal institutions and legal argumentation in order to try to achieve
their desired end of  safe, legal, and local abortion for pregnant people who seek it. Our
aim in this paper is not to provide a comprehensive account of  the decades of  feminist
law work that was undertaken in Ireland or, indeed, to suggest that formal legal changes
have brought that feminist law work to an end. Instead, using structured conversations
with eight invited abortion rights activists from Ireland and Northern Ireland as our
jumping-off  point, we seek to contribute to the complex retelling of  the stories of
abortion law reform in Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
The paper proceeds in five main parts. First, we outline our ethical and
methodological approach (Part 1), before briefly describing the prevailing legal and
political context in which the feminist law work that our participants discuss took place
(Part 2). We then look in some detail at three different elements of  feminist law work that
emerged especially clearly in our engagement with activists and which shaped our
understanding of  the phenomenon: ambivalence about law (Part 3), the multifaceted
nature of  feminist law work (Part 4), and feminist law work’s ‘everydayness’ (Part 5).
1 Our ethical and methodological approach 
In this article we investigate the feminist law work undertaken by eight non-lawyer
activists whom we invited to a workshop held in Ulster University, Belfast, on
23 November 2018. The participants were engaged in different ways in abortion rights
activism, with three working primarily in the Republic of  Ireland and five in Northern
Ireland. Our workshop took place at a crucial turning point: Irish abortion law had been
liberalised and there was a strong sense (as the slogan went at the time) that ‘the North is
Next’.5 Northern Irish feminist activists were at this point concentrating their attention
on lobbying for abortion law reform at Westminster. Before the workshop, and in
preparation for the discussion to be held there, Enright interviewed a number of  the
participants. These pre-workshop interviews helped us to shape the workshop discussion,
which was oriented towards identifying how the activists to whom we spoke thought
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about and enacted their relationship with law. The concept of  feminist law work emerged
from the workshop, rather than driving it. As we discussed what these women had spoken
about, how they thought about law, and how they had trained themselves to challenge,
manipulate, shape, undermine, ridicule and reform law as part of  their activism, it became
clear to us that what they had described was a vital form of  legal labour rooted in feminist
commitments and playing itself  out in their everyday engagements with law, politics,
reproduction, (il)legality, and activist strategising. Ethical approval for this qualitative
research was granted by the University of  Birmingham. All workshop participants and
interviewees gave full informed consent to their participation in the research as well as
use of  the resulting data in published outputs. All participants reviewed a draft of  this
article prior to final publication. 
The participants in our workshop and interviews were women who have been active
in struggles to reform abortion law in Northern Ireland and the Republic of  Ireland, and
in the spaces between them. Ailbhe Smyth has been involved in feminist and reproductive
rights activism for more than 40 years, is head of  the Coalition to Repeal the 8th
Amendment, and was one of  the co-directors of  Together for Yes, the official civil
society platform for a ‘Yes’ vote in the May 2018 referendum. Linda Kavanagh is a long-
time leader within the Abortion Rights Campaign and worked in social media for
Together for Yes. Erin D’Arcy is an artist and founder of  ‘In Her Shoes’; an intervention
in the referendum campaign which curated women’s anonymous first-hand stories of
being denied abortion care in Ireland. She published these stories on Facebook and, near
the end of  the campaign, in a hard copy form for distribution during canvassing. Of  the
Northern Ireland workshop participants, Sarah Ewart is a litigant who has undertaken
legal action to challenge Northern Ireland’s abortion law.6 Her mother Jane Christie, who
also contributed to the conversation, accompanied her. Emma Campbell and Kellie
O’Dowd were then co-directors of  Alliance for Choice. Goretti Horgan is an activist with
Alliance for Choice in Derry, work which she undertakes alongside her role as an
academic at Ulster University working on abortion research. 
Our aim in bringing these eight interlocutors together was not to ‘tell the whole story’
of  abortion law reform ‘North and South’; rather it was to begin a conversation on
feminist activists as key actors in processes of  legal change, complementing existing
literature on ‘formal’ law reform in both jurisdictions.7 We acknowledge that if  eight
different women had been in the room with us, or if  the same eight women had been in
the room with us six months earlier or later, the event could have been very different. We
are conscious too that our participants did not include people working specifically to
agitate for reproductive autonomy and freedom for women of  colour, migrant women,
women with disabilities, Traveller women, transpeople, and other specifically impacted
persons who may seek abortion care. Those activists’ experiences of  law reform will have
been different, and their experience of, engagement with, and perhaps rejection of
feminist law work and its inevitable pragmatism is worthy of  separate exploration. For the
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purposes of  this starting conversation, however, these were the eight activists with whom
we engaged, and whose experiences animate our account. 
In Northern Ireland, Alliance for Choice is the leading grassroots voice on abortion
law reform. In addition to providing direct practical support to women who need
abortions, it engages with other advocacy groups, such as Amnesty International, the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and the London Irish Abortion Rights
Campaign. In Ireland, particularly in the lead-up to the referendum vote, a much larger
collective action campaign came together which included a wide range of  loosely
connected groups and individuals; some single issue, and others more established.
Groups such as the Coalition to Repeal the 8th Amendment were key to persuading
organisations which do not have a primary focus on reproductive rights issues, such as
trade unions, to enter the fray on behalf  of  the movement. During the formal referendum
campaign, three organisations – the Abortion Rights Campaign, the Coalition to Repeal
the 8th Amendment and the National Women’s Council of  Ireland – came together to
form an official civil society campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote, called Together for Yes.8 Most,
although not all, pro-choice organisations in Ireland were affiliated with Together for Yes
during the referendum campaign. In spite of  these differences, the movements in both
jurisdictions are interlinked and, in some instances, interdependent, and they have often
worked together. Women from the North, and particularly from Alliance for Choice,
campaigned actively for the ‘Yes’ vote in the Republic’s referendum, especially in the
border counties. Similarly, since the Amendment was repealed, some activists in the South
have been involved in work to facilitate access to abortion services for women from
Northern Ireland. Activists are conscious that women who live in one jurisdiction may, in
future, need to access services in the other. For these reasons, it is productive to consider
all of  these activists together.
By use of  the term ‘activist’, we mean social change agents who participate in some
form in a social movement/collective action.9 Self-identifying as an activist is not essential
to this definition,10 and indeed some of  our participants did not overtly embrace this
label. Our engagement with feminist activists in the latter stages of  reform struggles on
both parts of  the island makes clear the importance to law and lawyers of  recognising
how these activists’ actions in, with, to and against law helped to shape reform processes.
In engaging with our activist participants, we were not aiming to arrive at ‘the truth’ of
feminist activist engagement in law in the abortion rights movements in Ireland and
Northern Ireland; any attempt to do so would be as distorting11 as attempts to create
dominant narratives of  abortion law reform that underplay or even invisibilise feminist,
activist labour. Neither do we attempt to narrate the internal dynamics of  these groups
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 71(3)
8     For official accounts of  Together for Yes’s strategy and activities, see Michael Barron, Learning from the 2018
Together for Yes Campaign (2019)
<https://www.togetherforyes.ie/app/uploads/2019/11/2019_TFY_Review.pdf?fbclid=IwAR33cJUSgdH-
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9     Chris Bobel, ‘‘I’m not an activist, though I’ve done a lot of  it’: Doing activism, being activist and the
‘perfect standard’ in a contemporary movement’ (2007) 6(2) Social Movement Studies 148. For wider
discussion, see Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor, ‘Forging feminist identity in an international movement: a
collective identity approach to social movements’ (1999) 24(2) Signs 363; Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy
Richards, Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux 2000); Scott Hunt and
Robert Benford, ‘Collective identity, solidarity and commitment’ in David Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and
Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Blackwell 2004).
10   Bobel ibid 157.
11   See generally Antoinette Burden, ‘“History” is now: feminist theory and the production of  historical
feminisms’ (1992) 1(1) Women’s History Review 25.
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or the many other feminist groups engaged both recently and earlier in the reproductive
rights struggles in Ireland. We recognise that there is no singular truth of  these
engagements, or one story of  reform; rather there are multiple stories and narratives that
together form the complex, textured background to the reform of  the law in both
jurisdictions. However, there is a ‘past’ to which multiple actors increasingly seek to lay
claim; notably, in the South, some political parties seek to represent repeal of  the 8th
Amendment as a product of  their actions or of  a ‘quiet revolution’,12 seemingly erasing
the substantial feminist law work that underpinned it. Informed by the intellectual
commitments of  feminist historiography,13 we know that recognising the authority of
feminist activists’ narrative accounts is part of  creating the legal history of  abortion law
reform in Ireland.14 As Cheryl Glenn has written in another context, ‘in choosing what
to show, how to represent it, and whom to spotlight … [we] subtly shape our
perceptions’15 of  the past. In this paper, we choose to show, represent, and spotlight
feminist law work and the activism that underpins it. Concentrating on these narratives
makes clear the importance of  rejecting any simplistic ‘legal’ telling of  abortion law
reform in Ireland and Northern Ireland in which court cases, legislative reform, or
parliamentary debates are presented as isolated and self-generated incidences of  legal and
political engagement. 
Although it is not an oral history or biographical project, our ethical and
methodological approach to the material offered to us by the participants is informed by
a commitment to pluralising the historiographical record(s) of  significant events, and to
the ‘ethically and intellectual responsible gesture that disrupts … frozen memories in
order to address silences, challenge absences, and assert women’s contributions to public
life’.16 As such we do not fact-check or authenticate the accounts and recollections of  our
participants; nor is any such process necessary. Instead, we recognise personal
recollection and experience as a valid source of  understanding processes of  legal change
and see the collection of  such accounts and their analysis as a means of  understanding
narrated memories to which law and lawyers are generally insufficiently attentive. In this,
we are informed and influenced by feminist commitments to recognising the authenticity
of  first-person narrative, the epistemological value of  personal experience, and the
standing of  activists as the most qualified narrators of  their own participation in activist
endeavours.17 Thus, while we contextualise the workshop and the moment in time in
which we spoke to these feminist law workers in Part 2, we do not otherwise seek to
explain, validate, or somehow ‘authenticate’ participants’ accounts. Instead, we recognise
them as the experts in their own experiences of  feminist law work. 
We use the word ‘work’ for a reason. This paper talks about a range of  legal activities
which formed part of  everyday abortion rights activism; peer and public legal education,
Abortion activism, legal change, and taking feminist law work seriously
12   Following the result of  the referendum to repeal the 8th Amendment, Taoiseach Leo Varadkar claimed that
‘a quiet revolution has taken place’. See, for example, RTE News, ‘Result is culmination of  quiet revolution,
says Varadkar’ 26 May 2018 <https://www.rte.ie/news/eighth-amendment/2018/0526/966132-reaction/>.
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(University of  Chicago Press 1998) 77.
14   As Enoch and Bessette write, ‘Feminist recovery … depends on the archive.’ Jessica Enoch and Jena
Bessette, ‘Meaningful engagements: feminist historiography and the digital humanities’ (2013) 64(4) College
Composition and Communication 634, 637.
15   Cheryl Glenn, ‘Lies, and method: revisiting feminist historiography’ (2000) 62(3) College English 387, 388.
16   Ibid 389.
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Political Controversies (Routledge 2004).
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developing new legal skills, lobbying institutional legal actors, mobilising popular support
for concrete legal change, generating narratives to delegitimate existing law and justify
reform, organised law-breaking, supporting litigation and more. These projects were
multifaceted: activists were doing many things at once, often across many different
institutional, political and community environments, and recognising that different
dispositions towards law are required and appropriate in different settings. They might be
drafting legislative amendments in one environment and distributing ‘illegal’ (but safe)
abortion medication in another. These activities were often unpaid, considered
unprofessional or illegitimate, done ‘on the move’, or in private or domestic space. In
characterising these activities as ‘work’, we draw on a long feminist tradition of  bending
and stretching the concept of  work in order to honour women’s marginalised labour.18
We not only recognise activists’ collective and individual engagement with law as work,
but demonstrate that aspects of  mainstream law reform work are dependent on feminist
law work At the same time, we recognise that feminist law work is alienated labour19 – it
is not only a site of  value and meaning-making. It can also be difficult and disappointing.
As we see in this paper, feminist law work does not indicate a legal vocation, or an
unambivalent commitment to law. It often looks more like reluctant, resistant or
pragmatic engagement.
Our attention to feminist law work on the island of  Ireland has relevance beyond
these jurisdictions. What this micro-story reveals is that feminist engagement with law,
even if  ‘cheeky’20 and irreverent, can be productive and heterodox, challenging
conventional or dominant tropes about legal (im)possibility, and that activists engaging as
feminist law workers consciously reclaim law from ‘elite’ disciplinary or professional
‘ownership’ by developing skills and knowledge that allow them to trouble, and force
change within, orthodox legal thinking. Thus, while presenting a ‘snapshot’ of  the
abortion law reform processes in Ireland and Northern Ireland, this paper also identifies
and insists upon the importance of  a frame for engagement – this feminist law work –
that is discernible in reproductive rights activism all over the world, as well as in other
social justice campaigns in which feminist activism is at the forefront.
2 Contextualising abortion activism in Northern Ireland and Ireland
As already noted, abortion laws in the Republic of  Ireland and Northern Ireland have
recently seen legal transformations unimaginable even a decade ago. In Northern Ireland,
abortion was previously criminalised under sections 58 and 59 of  the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861 with very few exceptions. In October 2019, abortion was
decriminalised in the jurisdiction by the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act
2019. This was legislative action taken by Parliament at Westminster during a period
where the devolved Assembly at Stormont was not functioning. Regulations pertaining to
legal provision of  abortion were introduced in March 2020. In the Republic, the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 71(3)
18   See further, Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work (Duke University Press 2011); Silvia Federici, Revolution at
Point Zero (PM Press 2012); J K Gibson-Graham, A Postcapitalist Politics (University of  Minnesota Press
2006).
19   Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Rowman & Littlefield 1983) 307
20   In this we are influenced by Fletcher’s articulation of  ‘cheeky witnessing’ which she claims has three
elements: ‘First, it is messy and irreverent in innovating with names to display the mixed genealogies of
sources of  feminist knowledge. Second, cheeky witnessing generates novel subject-figures, such as migrant
cleaners, who make knowing connections between different reproductive labourers as observers of  the trail
in diaspora space. Third, cheeky witnessing places funny objects, knickers in this instance, so as to join up
particular public locations and make them more, if  unevenly, comfortable for sexual and reproductive
bodies.’ Ruth Fletcher, ‘Cheeky witnessing’ (2020) 124 Feminist Review 124.
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constitutional provision which prohibited almost all abortions – Article 40.3.3, known as
the 8th Amendment – was repealed in May 2018. New abortion legislation, the Health
(Regulation of  Termination of  Pregnancy) Act 2018, was passed some months later and,
in principle, abortion care is now legally available across the country. 
This change was a long time coming. Neither jurisdiction embraced liberalising action
to reform the law on abortion for several years.21 Institutional dynamics within each
jurisdiction mean that change to the law took different forms. In Northern Ireland, for
example, a referendum was unnecessary since legal change was largely in the hands of
elected representatives. Targeted strategic litigation has recently been employed in
domestic courts to some positive effect.22 The relative institutional autonomy of
Westminster and the devolved Assembly at Stormont facilitates change to abortion law by
the ordinary mechanisms of  legislative reform, should elected representatives be moved
to use them.23 This situation was, however, complicated by the collapse of  the Stormont
Assembly between January 2017 and January 2020, and it was eventually Westminster
legislation that facilitated decriminalisation. In the Republic, by contrast, the 8th
Amendment and an unreceptive judiciary were perceived to present an impenetrable
obstacle to successful litigation. Strategic cases and petitions were brought in
international spaces instead. A referendum was not only unavoidable but perceived as a
beneficial way to break legislative deadlock.
There are thus important differences in experiences across the jurisdictions. However,
there are also inevitable commonalities and connections. First, both jurisdictions have had
definitively non-linear experiences of  the road to reform of  abortion law. In these non-
linear processes, no one event in either jurisdiction was responsible for triggering reform.
Rather, legal change followed the culmination of  multiple events particular to each
jurisdiction. Contingent, and often unexpected, moments have been opportunities to
develop and publicise reform work. In the Republic, these moments include the death of
Savita Halappanavar in 2012 and the experiences of  Amanda Mellet and Siobhan Whelan
in 2010 and 2011 who were required to travel to access abortion services in cases of  fatal
foetal abnormality. In Northern Ireland, Sarah Ewart’s sharing of  her experience of  fatal
foetal abnormality in 2013, a judicial review by the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission initiated in 2015,24 and an Inquiry by the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which reported
in 201825 are all notable examples. Second, legal change is only the starting point for
wider processes of  transition in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The new abortion laws are
still being embedded and reconfigured in both parts of  the island. Details around
practical provision and application of  the law remain to be settled. In this respect, reform
was not the end of  the story. At the time of  our interviews and workshop activists were
still working on influencing the practical details and roll-out of  the new legislation on the
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21   Siobhan Mullally, ‘Debating reproductive rights in Ireland’ (2005) 27(1) Human Rights Quarterly 78; Goretti
Horgan, ‘Abortion and citizenship rights in a devolved region of  the UK’ (2014) 13(1) Social Policy and
Society 39; Lisa Smyth, Abortion and Nation: The Politics of  Reproduction in Contemporary Ireland (Routledge
2017); Sheldon et al (n 4).
22   Family Planning Association for Northern Ireland v Minister for Health, Social Services and Public Safety (SPUC NI and
others intervening) [2004] NICA 39; The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2015] NIQB
102.
23   Jennifer Thomson, Abortion Law and Political Institutions: Explaining Policy Resistance (Palgrave 2019).
24    Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (n 22).
25   CEDAW Committee, Report of  the Inquiry Concerning the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and
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ground. Third, feminist activists North and South of  the border were motivated to speak
back to the effects of  law on the lived experiences of  gendered subjects and troubling
restrictive and heteronormative legal frameworks.26 They were concerned with the
empowerment of  women and pregnant persons, attentive to long-term, structural gender
imbalances within their respective jurisdictions and affected by first-hand experience of
the effects of  the law on the ground. We will now turn to explore the work they undertake
in more detail.
3 Ambivalence about law in feminist law work
Despite law’s obvious uses – its symbolic weight27 and its connection to coercive power
that can be used to redistribute rights and resources – feminist organising has always had
an ambivalent relationship with law; feminists cannot help but be conscious of  law’s
violence.28 There are recognised dangers; that a movement will invest too many of  its
resources in legal change and, in the process, become complicit with darker aspects of
legal power.29 Law tends to subject women to ever more extensive legal control, even in
the guise of  liberalisation, and can impose its logic on wider political discourse in ways
that suppress women’s desires and experiences.30 In discussions with our participants, it
became clear that, while they engaged closely with law and its various spaces, they
maintained a similar feminist suspicion of  law. This was evident in how they understood
the function of  law in their activist campaigns for change. The activists in our
conversation were clear that they undertook efforts towards reform because they knew,
as Emma Campbell noted when we spoke with her, that the prevailing law harmed women
and saw advocating for legal change as an essential ‘harm reduction exercise’. They were
not, however, comfortable with law. In part, this was because law’s insiders are not always
comfortable with them, or with their place as agitators for law reform. Goretti Horgan
brings up this issue in the context of  the relationship between feminist protest and
litigation:
So, we always had this kind of  thing where we were talking about legality even as
we were street campaigning, you know? We never saw the two as being separate.
I think that is until the Family Planning Association case.31 And then we [activists]
were told that we shouldn’t do any campaigning until the case was out of  the way,
until the case was heard and ruled on. Because you know, were we to be on the
streets or we were told we shouldn’t be outside of  the court, you know, we
shouldn’t be doing any campaigning really, you know just let the courts handle it.
Now, obviously we didn’t take any notice of  that. But there was, like an
imperative for a while there where you know, where we were frowned upon,
where we were seen as being kind of  wreckers.
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26   For an overview of  how feminist legal scholars have described and approached these types of  frameworks,
see Katharine Bartlett (ed), Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender 2nd edn (Routledge 2018); Janet
Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouché and Hila Shamir (eds), Governance Feminism: Notes from the Field
(University of  Minnesota Press 2019).
27   Sally Engle Merry, ‘What is legal culture? An anthropological perspective’ (2010) 48(2) Journal of
Comparative Law 40.
28   Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns (eds), Law’s Violence (University of  Michigan Press 1993); Rosemary
Hunter, ‘Law’s (masculine) violence: reshaping jurisprudence’ (2006) 17 Law and Critique 27; Hilary
Charlesworth, ‘Feminist ambivalence about international law’ (2005) 11 International Legal Theory 1.
29   See, for example, Ratna Kapur, ‘Human rights in the 21st century: take a walk on the dark side’ (2006) 28(4)
Sydney Law Review 665.
30   Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion: Feminist Politics beyond Law (University of  Illinois Press 2004) 5.
31   Family Planning Association (n 22). For discussion see Ruth Fletcher, ‘Abortion needs or abortion rights?
Claiming state accountability for women’s reproductive welfare’ (2004) 13(1) Feminist Legal Studies 123.
OA14
In their ambivalence towards law, feminist activists refuse law’s respectability, decentre law
in their work and campaigns, and often engage in a creative and provocative play around
law. Let us explore each of  these in turn.
3.1 REFUSING LAW’S RESPECTABILITY
At a fundamental level, feminist activists refuse the respectability of  law and the formal
legal domain. In other words, they question its authority and proprietary place in social
life. Of  course, that respectability is complicated. In the Northern Irish context, more
broadly, activists are conscious of  an older history of  law’s role in legitimating or not
effectively counter-acting violence.32 Emma Campbell summarised:
And, you know, growing up in Northern Ireland, the law was always very much
used as a tool of  control to the people as far I understood it, you know. We had,
you know, we grew up having to go through army turnstiles to get into the town
centre every day, that’s how we, how I feel that I saw the expression of  the law
in a, I don’t know, embodied in a human form. So, I don’t give a shit about the
law, really [laughs]. 
This lack of  automatic respect for law has played out in more recent pro-choice
organising in both jurisdictions. While law’s failings encouraged feminist activists to
engage in feminist law work towards reform, these same failings meant that law was
marginalised when activists imagined their desired outcomes. For example, feminist
organisations such as Alliance for Choice and the Coalition to Repeal the 8th Amendment
did not, in principle, favour the creation of  new legislation to regulate abortion access.
They preferred the approach of  jurisdictions such as Canada and Cuba where regulation
is the role of  the healthcare, as opposed to the legal or criminal justice, system.33 For
these groups, the preference was repeal of  the existing law, followed by decriminalisation
and limited legal regulation. As Ailbhe Smyth put it, ‘none of  the pro-choice
organisations really wanted there to be legislation’. However, this preference was gradually
tempered by an understanding that law – and feminist engagement with it – was necessary
in the given circumstances. 
In the Irish context, there seemed to be an understanding that moving from hyper-
restrictive constitutional regulation to ‘no’ statutory regulation of  abortion would not
garner sufficient support, at least in political institutions, so that during the referendum
pro-choice organisations endorsed the government’s proposed legislative scheme, albeit
at times with some reservations. For Linda Kavanagh, the sense of  law’s symbolic and
communal role was also crucial:
To be honest … the legality of  abortion isn’t necessarily that important to your
grassroots anarchist leftie activist. But in the wider sense, we know that people
love the law. They think that morality lies within the law or some of  their morality
comes from the law, which to me is really bizarre but is true. So that when you
decriminalise something, you do remove some of  the stigma and shame. And so,
kind of  being aware of  that. So, that’s kind of  where respectability comes in
there.
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This account of  the emergence of  an unsettled, if  strategically coherent, attitude to law
and its respectability is not surprising. Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey argue that legal
consciousness is ‘multiple and contingent’; simultaneously obedient and resistant.34 In the
same situation, individuals may maintain a sense of  themselves as ‘before’, ‘with’ and
‘against’ the law. It is not surprising then that participants in our workshop maintained a
strong critical oppositional sense of  law’s dualities and were reluctant to embrace legal
change as an end in itself, even as they engaged law sometimes for their own purposes.35
In feminist law work, this refusal of  law as something respectable and deserving of
deference is accompanied by a decentring of  law.
3.2 DECENTRING LAW
Carol Smart famously encouraged feminists to decentre law and prefer other strategies for
change in order to avoid legal colonisation of  feminist campaigning.36 This was echoed
in our participants’ clear sense that legal change was not sufficient to deliver meaningful
reproductive justice. Irish and Northern Irish feminists are under no illusion that law
offers an easy solution to the problems they are grappling with. A reluctance to engage
with law as an end in itself  appears to stem from participants’ concrete experience of
legal frameworks that have either withheld help from or failed appropriately to respond
to the real-life needs of  women and pregnant persons. This reluctance does not dissipate
even when some of  the key demands and desired outcomes of  feminist law work have
been achieved, such as repeal of  the 8th Amendment. The long delay between the
referendum date (25 May 2018) and the coming into force of  the legislation that made
provision for lawful abortion (1 January 2019) – the time during which our workshop
took place – was a temporal site of  real frustration with the law. Erin D’Arcy reflected on
this, saying:
I just received [an online message] last night … it’s been six months since we had
the vote and … she’s having to email [the ‘In Her Shoes’ Facebook page]
anonymously instead of  just going to her GP.
In some ways, these disappointments are anticipated from the beginning of  feminist law
reform campaigns. As Kellie O’Dowd said of  Alliance for Choice, ‘we realised very early
on in our campaign that legislative change is never going to be enough’. This insight was
not only a product of  experience in abortion rights activism but a conclusion drawn from
feminist law work in other areas.37 For her, campaigns to achieve equal pay in the 1970s
in particular revealed that formal law reform is often limited in what it can achieve and
must be supplemented with meaningful change in socio-political attitudes and culture.
Legal struggle is intertwined with social struggle, and feminist demands extend beyond
anything law alone could provide.38 This understanding leads legislative reform to be one,
but not the only, focus of  the work Alliance for Choice does. As O’Dowd put it:
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… along with campaigning and lobbying around legislative change, we need to
change the hearts and minds of  people … we bring a very grassroots and
personal experience to law reform but we don’t put all our eggs in one basket.
Similarly, Linda Kavanagh remembers that the stakes the Irish referendum were far
broader than constitutional change:
And I suppose, no, I don’t feel like I was just advocating for constitutional
reform, and very few people that I would ever deal with would be in it simply for
the constitutional reform aspect. It was that we knew we needed to make this
change. We knew it was … For me and for the organisation that I volunteer with,
it’s that we knew this was the next obstacle and we weren’t going to get anything
unless this was removed … But I think not a lot of  people would just be in it for
the sheer joy of  change of  the constitution. 
Awareness of  this relationship between law and social change does not necessarily lead to
the same strategic conclusions. For Kellie O’Dowd, awareness of  the limitations of  the
incrementalist approach to legislation then about to be passed in the Republic only
strengthened the need to ensure that the Alliance continued to ask for the broadest and
most comprehensive possible legislative provision in the North. By contrast, for Ailbhe
Smyth, in heading a coalition whose members differed widely on the proper legal
approach to abortion, and in the absence of  a legislative proposal that all were agreed on,
acknowledging law’s limitations meant adopting a narrow legal project. She explained that
legal change takes place in stages, and her role, as she saw it, was necessarily confined to
getting the initial vote in favour of  repeal of  the 8th Amendment, before returning the
legislative question to the parliament.
I saw my job in the Coalition as repealing the Eighth Amendment – actually, we
did that, and that had to be done … I don’t think any of  us ever thought … or
most of  us didn’t think that the legislation we would get straight up after repeal
would be perfect, and indeed it is obviously very, very far from perfect … I’m
not the expert on this aspect of  things. So I’ll quite happily say, not that it’s
altogether in other people’s hands, because we all have a vested interest but that
the legislative part is really in your [ie lawyers’] hands now, more than in the hands
of  activists like me.
Although they were aware of  law’s limitations, this group of  activists was also conscious
of  its power. Although law was not venerated, it could be used instrumentally to try to
compel action by otherwise-unresponsive states. They could deploy law as ‘a stick to beat
the establishment with’ (Linda Kavanagh). They recognised the formal, establishment
power of  the law to compel the state. At the same time, this recognition was tinged with
irreverence for law and for state power. As Linda Kavanagh put it, engagement with law
is such an effective tool of  persuasion for the establishment because, ‘you know … they
are horny for the law. They love it.’ For Alliance for Choice, refusal to venerate law was
bound up with a willingness to get around it, ridicule it, break it, or subvert it as necessary
to ensure abortion access for the women they wanted to support. Emma Campbell noted:
… as an activist organisation we’ve been happy not to take the law that seriously
on many occasions … the law is an ass so we’ll do whatever we can around,
above and beyond it, whenever we can.
3.3 TICKLING LAW
Precisely because it does not take its law ‘that seriously’, Alliance for Choice has been
able, thirdly, to emphasise creativity in their approach to law reform. It is less persuaded
by law’s existing limits and boundaries than by the need to respond to problems on the
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ground. This has led feminist activists to be more interested in innovatively combining
international approaches than establishment lawyers might be. Emma Campbell explains:
[I am a] creative problem solver because I come from, you know, a creative
background. And I get a little bit frustrated when legal people, let’s say, or
political people use or describe or imagine what the future looks like but only
looking at their small tiny bit of  experience or example of  what they already have
in front of  them. Because, you know, especially from being at international
conferences and you see the brilliant way that some countries have dealt with the
fact that they have restrictive laws but they have interpreted, for instance, they
have interpreted the word ‘health’ to include the World Health Organisation
interpretation of  that which is, which includes social issues, which includes
mental health, which includes being able to provide for your family. So ... on a
day to day basis we get people phoning asking us how we can help them. And so
as people who have been at the, I guess the sharp end of  physically providing
abortion help or providing abortions or physically being the body in between a
protestor and a person, then your approach is probably a little bit more pragmatic
and a little bit less … [W]e feel frustrated that they so almost pedantically
interpret the law, interpret the law conservatively and don’t see any wiggle room
in there where others might  ... you know, there are definitely lawyers in other
countries and in other contexts that have the same law in front of  them and see
it differently, you know. 
Emma describes Alliance for Choice’s feminist law work as ‘tickling law’; that is, deploying
agentic resources to go beyond a docile and disciplinary relation to law in order to engage
in play and provocation around law and its limits.39 In this respect, feminist law work
often employs significant creativity, playing games with law and pushing its boundaries in
ways that transcend law’s control.40 This is designed to test law, to reveal its hidden limits,
effects or hypocrisies and, ultimately, to stimulate change. Emma reflects on how tickling
has been carried out through tactics like covert distribution of  abortion medication,
women publicly declaring that they have procured or helped to procure an abortion, and
openly providing information on the ways in which feminist activists assist in pushing the
boundaries of  the criminal law.41 This strategy of  ‘tickling’ serves to stage a disruption to
law, legal time and its subjects. It challenges law’s dominant narrative about itself  in acts
of  resistance. These acts are reminiscent of  the actions of  others who have acted as
provocateurs to law in areas such as welfare,42 racial injustice43 and decolonisation.44
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4 The multifaceted nature of feminist law work
The participants in our workshop and interviews are neither lawyers nor institutional
feminists employed by state or government bodies.45 However, their perspectives on legal
change should not be viewed as ‘external’; they have been intimately caught up in legal
change. In particular, they are adept at identifying locations of  law work and at
strategising across various locations – formal and informal, parliamentary and judicial,
national and transnational – to build momentum towards formal legal change. In
consequence, the locations of  feminist law work are multifaceted and overlapping. 
Given the long-term lack of  movement towards reform via referendum (Ireland) or
legislative change (Northern Ireland), feminist activists in both jurisdictions had to find
alternative fora and spaces – domestic courts and international human rights bodies, for
example – in which to develop and publicise their arguments for change. In other words,
when legislatures were unresponsive to demands for a liberalising referendum,46 more
permissive constitutional interpretations,47 or legislative change,48 feminist activists
mobilised other legal sites for ‘politics by other means’.49 Legal arguments developed at
these sites were then translated back into potential legislative discourse once the
opportunity emerged, sometimes with a view to compelling parliamentarians to act, or
reacting to politicians reneging on commitments to support change. Speaking of  her
daughter Sarah Ewart’s experiences in trying to secure help from politicians after having
to travel for termination in a case of  fatal foetal anomaly, Jane Christie captured this
process and strategy of  moving between politics and law:
… we wrote to 108 MLAs ... we ended up trying our best as Sarah said for two
years going round the MLAs, we got absolutely … there was plenty of
understanding, plenty of  comparisons in their own situations but nobody was
actually listening to us. We got agreement from the DUP that they would not use
a petition of  concern and they would support [a Bill proposing access to
abortion in cases of  fatal foetal abnormality]. At that stage then they back-
pedalled with us, they had agreed also a change in law, [a senior politician] back-
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pedalled with us, and at that point Sarah and I realised that to get any help we
were going to have to go through the courts. 
This comment also gestures towards the first location of  multifaceted feminist law work:
domestic courts and litigation.
4.1 DOMESTIC COURTS
In Northern Ireland domestic litigation was a core element of  the strategy for legal
mobilisation and law reform. This took a number of  forms and particular recent high-
profile cases – Ewart’s case,50 A and B51 and the judicial review initiated by the Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission52 – were turning points, not only in terms of
substantive law but also in terms of  connecting legal doctrinal abstraction to empirical
lived realities for the electorate. Speaking directly to Sarah Ewart, Kellie O’Dowd
captured the importance of  her case for the movement quite beyond the strict legal
outcome:
… until Sarah, until what happened to you did happen and came out into the
public, like, you know, we would have meetings and there’d be two people and a
dog turn up, and you’re kind of  going abortion law reform’s never going to
happen, we’re never going to get the [19]67 Abortion Act extended. But then
when your story went public, it absolutely changed the discourse because if  you
have a situation where it’s surrounded by silence and stigma, but you were the
human face and you were the wanted, the very much wanted pregnancy and it
kind of  really opened people’s minds to going ‘what do you mean she can’t access
abortion here? What do you mean she has to be basically, she has to go to
London to access this?’ That made people interested and it made them sit up so
I know that youse [referring to Sarah and Jane] didn’t know what was happening
in terms of  what was going on for you, but as an abortion rights activist who had
been working on this for five years, it was the light bulb that we had needed in
terms of  saying this is what happens to women who can’t access reproductive
healthcare here. So, I want to thank you … And I always said that … the tipping
point when we’re out doing workshops would be the Sarah Ewart case and
everybody knows that case and everybody can relate to that and it’s so tangible
because it allows us to have those conversations. 
This seemed in some ways to be precisely what Sarah Ewart hoped would be the effect
of  her decision to pursue justice through the courts. Even though her mother, Jane
Christie, said ‘[w]e don’t class ourselves as activists but we can clearly see that there is a
problem here in Northern Ireland … and it’s disgusting’, Sarah’s motivation was clear. In
her words, she decided ‘we’ll just keep going until we try and get it changed’. This
illustrates well the agency and the feminist law work involved for individual litigants in
taking cases of  this kind: Sarah’s case was taken partly for herself, but partly also to
redress an injustice that was systemic and that was impacting on other women, and which
politicians in Northern Ireland did not seem to be willing to resolve. 
Other cases pursued not by those seeking reform, but by the state, also played
important roles in turning the tide in Northern Ireland; particularly the case of  a woman
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who was prosecuted for acquiring abortion medication for her daughter.53 It reinforced
– North and South – the potency of  continuing criminalisation, and activists were
involved in ensuring that, as much as possible, the case proceeded through the courts
rather than disappearing quickly through a guilty plea. Goretti Horgan reflected on this
case to show how this process illuminated both the inadequacy of  the existing law’s
framing of  abortion, and the lived costs of  enforcing the law: 
That actually makes me think … [of] the mother who’s taken the judicial review
on the decision to prosecute her for getting the abortion pills for her daughter,
because when that was reported in the media, it was reported that she was
charged with getting ‘poison’ to try to cause her daughter to have an abortion.54
Now the poison was those very safe pills and that are available on the NHS, et
cetera. And … everybody else pleaded guilty and accepted a caution or whatever
so there was never any, there was never any narrative about them except what we
ourselves kind of  knew in private or whatever … And I think that some of
what’s come out since, I mean the fact that the police actually took the daughter
out of  her classroom, to be interviewed … we wouldn’t have heard that if  the
court case hadn’t happened. You know, there’s a whole lot of  like small details
like that that have absolutely horrified even people who are against abortion.
They’re saying why would they do that to a wee girl who’s had enough on her
plate anyway. People who were forced, there have been too many people who
were forced to tell their stories … You know, people forced to tell their stories
who maybe really would want – including you, Sarah, you know, who’d prefer to
be private and everything but are forced to tell them because of  these awful laws
that we have and to go through court cases that really, they shouldn’t have to.
Feminist law work moves between locations – courts and legislature, for example –
because it understands that legal principles formulated at one site may be transformed
and transformative when they are translated for another. For instance, a case that has
‘failed’ in court may produce unexpected victories when it is considered by the
legislature.55 Goretti Horgan describes an example of  the latter in the aftermath of  the
UK Supreme Court decision in A and B.56 The litigants in that case asked for free access
to abortion from the National Health Service for women resident in Northern Ireland.
While the court ultimately decided against those women, Alliance for Choice’s
campaigning around this case was instrumental in the government’s decision, announced
the following day, to facilitate free access for Northern Irish women. That decision had a
real and positive effect in making abortion accessible – albeit subject to travel – for many
more women in Northern Ireland. Again, that was made possible through a long-term
engagement with the question of  securing free NHS abortions for people in Northern
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Ireland, and through productive engagement between activists and sympathetic practising
lawyers. Goretti Horgan describes it thus:
Whenever Alliance for Choice first started, and we were looking to get the
Abortion Act [1967] extended to here … [we were told] it couldn’t happen, it
would destroy the Peace Process. Literally for ten years we were told that from
1998 to 2008 ... How, I don’t know. So, then when we realised that wasn’t going
to happen, we started to look for free abortions on the NHS and I think like it
was about 2002 we thought about taking a legal route and we started looking, we
actually put out a press release and it was covered in the papers and all, looking
for somebody who would be willing to try to get an NHS abortion and then take
a case about it … and we were getting questions asked in Parliament all the time
… we had lawyers in London … kind of  older people, like my age, and they were
keeping an eye the whole time and in 2012 they came and said, you know, you
don’t have to have somebody who’s asked, we’ve checked, you don’t have to have
somebody who’s asked for an NHS abortion, you just have to have somebody
who’s got like a good story and we’ll take, you know, we will run. So, that’s how
the A and B case57 came about. Now, we never thought that that would work and
sure enough it didn’t because actually they lost, they lost in the Supreme Court
and yet the very next day, the announcement was made that there would be free
NHS abortions … And certainly without the court case, it probably wouldn’t
have been even in their minds, so like … it didn’t win, but it helped. 
In this respect, activists in Northern Ireland had perhaps a greater appreciation of  the
potential of  court cases than some lawyers involved and worked to ensure that cases went
ahead. Of  one such case, Goretti Horgan remembered:
And the fact that she then, that her lawyers, I mean, there was … there was a lot
of  activist intervention that led to her lawyers realising that there were defences
that she could put forward and that it wasn’t a case that, you know, she just had
to do what everybody else did and plead guilty in order to get it over with. I think
that if  it hadn’t been for the activists’ interventions with her barristers etc, that
that actually, you know, she may not be taking that case now and of  course we
crowdfunded to make sure that she was able to get started on the judicial review
because there was a big nervousness about it and she … was very frightened
about being left with costs and things like that … So … there was activist
involvement in ensuring that the case did actually happen.
4.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
As well as domestic litigation, international human rights law emerged as indispensable to
the process for change in Northern Ireland and a key location for feminist law work.
However, leveraging that body of  law required significant legal sophistication, given the
constitutional complexities of  the devolution settlement. Prior to the devolution of
criminal justice powers to Stormont in 2010, activists in Northern Ireland focused their
campaigning efforts on Westminster. Following 2010, attention turned to Stormont and
lobbying for devolved action. When it became clear that this approach would not be
fruitful, activists reframed abortion as a matter of  international human rights law
compliance, arguing that there was no constitutional impediment to Westminster
intervention. 
This required a number of  critical steps. The first was establishing that the law in
Northern Ireland violated human rights and, particularly, the Human Rights Act 1998.
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This was achieved through domestic litigation.58 Sarah Ewart was an intervener in this
case. The second was establishing that, as a matter of  human rights law, Westminster
could be compelled to attend to abortion in Northern Ireland notwithstanding the
devolution settlement. This was achieved largely by lobbying MPs and engaging in various
parliamentary processes, including the Women and Equalities Committee consultation on
abortion in Northern Ireland.59 Alliance for Choice was central to coordinating and
shaping this work. The third was establishing that the law as it stood constituted
violations of  international human rights law, which was achieved when Alliance for
Choice and other organisations60 successfully requested an inquiry from the CEDAW
Committee.61 In the course of  the inquiry, when Committee members visited Northern
Ireland, it was found that the law produced manifest violations of  international human
rights law.62 This inquiry advanced the (successful) argument that Westminster was not
precluded from taking action on abortion and, in fact, that the UK had an international
obligation effectively to take steps to resolve those violations of  human rights law. The
fourth was creating clear imperatives for and guidance in respect of  what could be done
to resolve these violations at a doctrinal level, including putting an end to ongoing and
active prosecution for people participating in (unlawful) self-managed abortion in
Northern Ireland. Again, this was significantly achieved by engagement with the CEDAW
Committee, which expressly recommended a moratorium on future prosecutions and the
cessation of  ongoing prosecutions.63
As a result of  this ability to shift between courts and institutions, from the national to
the transnational and back again, activists in Northern Ireland successfully and
strategically deployed international human rights law in laying the groundwork for the
decriminalisation of  abortion in October 2019 and its subsequent regulation. As this
suggests, feminist law work requires shifting between – and sometimes working across –
different national and international locations simultaneously. Even if  activists are
focusing on a law-making process outside of  parliament, they must also work to ensure
that the outcome of  that process will be well received by the legislature in future and seek
support from international bodies when debate at the national level has become stymied. 
In the Republic of  Ireland, the dominant and very limiting mainstream interpretations
of  the 8th Amendment meant there was little opportunity to force the Oireachtas to
liberalise abortion law using domestic litigation.64 Instead, arguments were made in
international judicial and quasi-judicial institutions. In particular, although litigation in
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A, B & C v Ireland65 did not demonstrate that the 8th Amendment violated the European
Convention on Human Rights, it did identify that the absence of  any process by which
women could assess whether they were entitled to access abortion within the limited
constitutional provision constituted a violation of  Article 8. As a result, the Oireachtas
legislated for access to abortion in 2013 – a full 30 years after the constitutional provision
was introduced. While the A, B & C litigation failed in its broader objective to establish
the rights-incompatibility of  the constitutional status quo, it made clear the limitations of
the constitutional framework and coincided with the death of  Savita Halapannavar, a
woman who died following refusal of  abortion in Galway in 2012, and whose death
ignited widespread activism, bolstering the preceding practices of  pro-choice feminist
activists.66 As Ailbhe Smyth put it, ‘the case that really did make a difference to our more
recent campaigning was the A, B, C: the set of  three cases that went to the European
courts and the European courts gave an instruction to government that they had to clarify
the legislative parameters’.67
The experience of  engaging with the European Court of  Human Rights and seeking
clear determination that Ireland’s law violated human rights nudged activists towards
other international institutions, specifically the United Nations (UN). The UN Human
Rights Committee found – in Mellet68 and Whelan69 – that the prohibition of  abortion in
situations of  fatal foetal anomalies could constitute a violation of  the right to be free
from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment protected in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, further bolstering the arguments for
change. While these engagements with international human rights law were useful in the
campaign for repeal of  the 8th Amendment in Ireland, they were not per se critical to
securing the commitments to the Citizens’ Assembly and then to the referendum of  2018.
Those commitments are better understood as the product of  a combination of  political
coincidence, timing, and relentless and resilient feminist activism. 
This engagement with national and international spaces demonstrates our previous
comment above that law reform processes are not linear. Recognising often-unexpected
spaces, moments and events as landmarks and opportunities to articulate and make claims
for reproductive justice and abortion law reform was a critical part of  feminist law work,
both North and South. Activists had to be ready when the tide turned. National and
international challenges surrounding Brexit also offered another opportunity for activists
in Northern Ireland. For example, Kellie O’Dowd noted how the minority government
in Westminster, reliance on the DUP, Brexit, and resulting tensions between the DUP and
other Members of  Parliament created opportunities that Alliance for Choice was ready to
take advantage of. Indeed, that preparedness to take advantage of  such situations was part
of  their activist strategising:
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I suppose … in any crisis you have to take the opportunities that present
themselves … the shit show that is Brexit – excuse my language – and the Tory
reliance on the DUP has played into our hands because we’ve had Labour and
Conservative MPs who … want to give the DUP a bloody nose … in this area
of  chaos, we’ve been able to, I suppose, gain some political capital. And we’re
going to keep on doing that.
Or as Emma Campbell put it:
… to misappropriate another famous Irish phrase, England’s misfortune is
Northern Ireland’s opportunity at the minute and we’re trying to make sure that
we’re not going to leave them alone about abortion in Northern Ireland and we
really hope that it causes them a massive pain in their side.
This key demand of  feminist law work – to be active at many sites at once and to ‘get our
fingers in all the abortion pies’ (Emma Campbell) – played out differently on each side of
the Irish border. Given Northern Ireland’s place within the post-colonial, and soon-to-be
post-Brexit, UK, Northern Ireland activists worked not only in varied locations of
legislatures, courts and international processes, but also in various jurisdictions. They
undertook feminist law work in Northern Ireland, in Westminster, and in the Republic of
Ireland where they substantially supported efforts for Repeal, both as a marker of  the all-
island nature of  abortion rights activism and because success in the South held significant
potential for momentum in the North.
4.3 LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The wider public sphere is also, of  course, a site of  activist legal mobilisation. As McCann
has written of  social movement litigation, legal activism has ‘radiating’ or ‘spillover’
effects and value beyond the formal legal process and its instrumental gains and losses,
through moments of  engagement with legal institutions and opportunities increasing
public rights consciousness, for instance.70 Much feminist law work goes into
translating71 or ‘vernacularising’72 new legal claims and norms wrung from legal
processes for everyday usage and understanding.73 This activity was evident in the
abortion rights campaigning on the island of  Ireland as well. Erin D’Arcy describes in
detail how she used ‘In Her Shoes’ to translate legal concepts for ordinary members of
the public engaging with her website:
Maybe a year ago or so I probably wouldn’t have been able to pronounce [the
word] autonomy or know what it meant. So, I had to look it up and go, ‘What
does autonomy even mean? I’ve heard this word, I’ve seen it, I don’t even know
how to say it’. And I feel like a lot of  people have no idea and so these words are
all being used by professionals and people who are, you know, knowledgeable or
whatever and it really alienates a lot of  people and so they feel like, ‘I don’t know
what this is, I don’t know how to say it’. And so when I realised that myself  …
I kind of  tried to help break that down a little bit … So like I would use the word
autonomy and then I would also include ‘the right to govern myself ’ in the
explanation. So that way people who are reading ... would start to piece that
together 
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Emma Campbell also described an important part of  Alliance for Choice’s current
strategy as being focused on ‘educating people mostly in England about what Northern
Ireland is and the fact that we don’t have an abortion law.’ 
Accordingly, activists are simultaneously law-makers and strategic teachers of  law.
They not only help the public to understand what law is but also make them aware of
opportunities to engage in the democratic process around law and law reform. The
activist role in translating the outcomes of  formal legal processes for a wider political
audience is crucial to legal change. However, legal discourse is not necessarily ‘made’ at
one site and ‘translated’ at another; feminist law work means active intervention in both
spaces and is directly generative of  new legal norms. Activist legal agency is not confined
to reacting to missives from ‘a distant, official terrain wholly defined by elite judges,
lawyers and professional legal commentators’.74 As this account of  feminist law work
shows, that terrain is neither distant nor necessarily official, and is formed by and through
imaginative and insistent activist interventions. 
5 The ‘everydayness’ of feminist law work
Having pieced together a view of  the multiple spaces and complex approach to law in
feminist law work, it is necessary to turn to the everyday nature of  this work. What are
the everyday practices and activities that stimulate legal change? The discussions emerging
from our interviews and workshop indicate that there are a number of  responses to this
question. We will focus on three: adaptability and skill; narrative production and
management; and labour.
5.1 ADAPTABILITY AND DEVELOPING NEW SKILLS
First of  all, and perhaps definitively, feminist law work requires feminist activists to be
adaptable. Such work often demands the development of  new skills or knowledge to
respond to shifting constitutional, legal, political or social opportunities and
developments.75 This is particularly evident in the context of  Northern Ireland.
Following the collapse of  the devolved Assembly at Stormont in January 2017 the
jurisdiction did not have a functioning devolved government until January 2020. This
meant that there was not a working legislative institution in Northern Ireland through
which formal law reform could be advanced. There was also a clear acceptance that, even
if  it were functioning, Stormont was a hostile place for abortion law reform. As Kellie
O’Dowd explained in a pre-workshop interview:
We have fucking research after research, we have just a legislature that are not
fucking interested, so we need to take this opportunity … [I]f  they legislated, if
they were pushed, through public opinion, to legislate it would be FFA [fatal
foetal anomaly] and maybe sex crimes, they might even wiggle out of  that, and it
would be tiny legislative change, so the hope is that we get this sorted out before
they get back.76
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As a result – as noted above – feminist groups turned their focus to Westminster, to
primary legislation, and to issues of  constitutional law and devolution, all in the context
of  ongoing negotiations regarding the UK’s planned exit from the EU. In navigating this
shift, feminist activists not only had to develop a host of  new arguments (about
devolution, for example, and the question of  whether abortion is a reserved or devolved
issue), but also adapt to new political challenges in a context where the predominant
sentiment in the Westminster Parliament is at least somewhat pro-choice. Emma
Campbell reflected on what this has required of  activists:
There’s a slight issue with the Northern Ireland campaigning at the minute
having to be at Westminster … we are not convincing MPs in Westminster to be
pro-choice. The house is pro-choice. We are talking about issues of  devolution,
we’re talking about the Sewell Convention … I’ve read the Good Friday
Agreement for no thanks whatsoever.
In this respect, activists are required to respond to political and legal changes, look to
different areas of  law, and expand their networks and resources in these areas. They must
do so often in very short time-frames, needing to be ready to offer quick, digestible
analysis, proposals, expertise, and arguments to a range of  audiences, even in highly
technical and sometimes unclear or uncertain terrains of  law.
This adaptability means that we can understand legal claims-making not only as a tool
which facilitates campaigning but also as a resource that shapes and changes social
movements.77 As activists have become experienced in law reform processes – albeit
approaching law often rather instrumentally – they have invested greater resources and
energies in legal mobilisation, leading to shifts in future tactics and in their self-
understanding as legal actors. The challenge that this poses is exacerbated when we
consider that, like many feminist activists, they must adapt, not only to single mode of
feminist law work (formal legal change) but also between modes of  work. In particular,
they must adapt relationships between policy and law reform work and direct assistance-
based activism for abortion-seekers.78 In addition to being lay-lawyers and legal
commentators, our participants are also involved in activity to support abortion-seeking
women, to help them practically, to offer counselling, to engage in training and awareness-
raising campaigns, to engage with the media on a regular basis, and to construct a voice on
social media. These are disparate forms of  activity requiring differing skills, a degree of
self-training and an ability to switch between these positions on a daily, weekly or hourly
basis. As Susan Buck-Morss has observed, when activists teach and train themselves, they
also empower themselves for future action.79 In time, Alliance for Choice found that
political and legal allies came to rely on them so that being able to fulfil that role becomes
central to their ability to influence the legal process. As Kellie O’Dowd says: 
In the morning if  [abortion was decriminalised] and there had to be a submission
on well what do you want the new law to look like, I have no doubt that
politicians would call me. You know I have no doubt about that. Because they
haven’t a fucking clue and they know we’re the real experts.
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5.2 NARRATIVE PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT
Notably, feminist activists are involved in narrative production, and management of  these
narratives.80 Social movements literature emphasises the role of  activists in ‘framing’ social
problems in ways that convince sympathetic members of  the public of  the need for
collective action.81 A frame is a simplified, condensed reinterpretation of  a social problem.
It often reworks older, culturally embedded interpretations, amplifying some aspects and
extending others. Perhaps one of  the most important elements involved in feminist law
work on abortion, then, is the framing, production, curation and advancement of
narratives from and about women’s, and others’, experience of  current legal and healthcare
frameworks regulating abortion.82 These narrative accounts have proven powerful and
affective in both jurisdictions as a way to educate about abortion and to stimulate public
discussion; they make concrete the real life of  abortion law and can underpin significant
shifts in public opinion (held and/or expressed). This is evident, for example, in the public
mobilisation and shifts in political discourse that occurred following Savita Halappanavar’s
death in Galway in 2012 and Sarah Ewart’s decision to speak of  her experience of  being
denied abortion care in Northern Ireland in 2013. For our participants, such narratives
were a way of  making law real and affective, showing its impacts and calling for
accountability. They recognised the power of  this narrative production, as well as its costs
for those whose lives and experiences were publicised, as made clear in the exchange
between Kellie O’Dowd and Sarah Ewart already recounted above.
These narratives emerge as a means through which feminists can seek to ‘hack’ the
legal system. By this we mean that they can stimulate a change in debate when other
sources, including law, cannot; such narratives can be employed to break deadlock or
stagnation in discussion on abortion law and its everyday effects. In particular, as
Francesca Polletta has argued, narratives rely on ‘emotional identification or familiar plots
rather than on testing or adjudication of  truth claims’.83 Stories of  personal experience
are difficult for opponents to negate. In addition, they give abstract legal frames a plot
and map them onto a set of  lived experiences.84 For this reason, narratives can connect
people to claims for justice in the way that ‘simple’ legal or political arguments might not;
as Kellie O’Dowd said: 
[H]uman rights doesn’t work. Bodily autonomy doesn’t work. Feminist
arguments don’t work. Your story, real life stories, do absolutely work. 
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At the same time, personal narratives afford a subject position to those telling their stories
that formal legal process has not offered.85 As Sarah Ewart explained:
Yeah, in court you’re very much just a case. You’re not really a person. I find
when like when we met with [a conservative public figure], she said ‘oh I read
your stuff  in the papers’. But when she came to the house and actually heard
what all had happened, she was like ‘I didn’t realise’. But she sat in tears at
different parts of  me telling her things. So, I think telling it like this and meeting
with people is completely different to how it’s come through court ...
An important part of  feminist law work in this area, therefore, is framing these stories
and making decisions on how they can best be used, while maintaining respect for the
position of  the woman who speaks. This was a prominent theme in Erin D’Arcy’s
account of  managing ‘In Her Shoes’. Erin reflected on her role as one of  careful, political
curation:
I didn’t have like rules to follow of  what stories I could tell and what stories I
should not tell but I knew that there was a responsibility in what stories were
going out and the amount of  people that were reading them and how it would
impact their vote … there were some stories that … I knew wouldn’t be received
well given what had been going on in the media at the time and so I … had to
hold it until maybe after the referendum or a different day, depending on what
was going on.
Through its effective production of  narrative, ‘In Her Shoes’ offered people a way to have
difficult conversations, on and offline, and had the potential to appeal to a wide variety
of  people who were often outside the traditional remit of  feminist activism. Speaking of
the website, Linda Kavanagh said:
… it was so, so important and for women to be able to tell their stories
anonymously and then for people to be able to share it in a way that was non-
confrontational was really, really powerful, and it really, really worked.
However, narrative production is also a weighty and a challenging part of  feminist law
work. Our participants demonstrated keen awareness of  the ethical concerns that come
with narrative production and management. These include the privacy of  the individuals
involved, including some caught up with law, who perhaps did not want to have their
stories told in such a public way. Feminist law work’s commitment to women’s agency,
autonomy and lived experience creates ethical compulsion towards taking care in the
production of  these narratives. Erin D’Arcy’s story of  the daily labour involved in
curation of  ‘In Her Shoes’ illustrates this in clear terms. By the end of  the referendum
campaign, 10–15 people a day were sending their abortion stories to her:
I kind of  felt a lot of  personal responsibility that when they were sending me
these stories that I needed to be there because I was very, very aware that people
were anxious to send something like that, and also that they were really
vulnerable sending that. A lot of  times women would tell me that it was their first
time ever telling somebody or their first time every writing it down and how
healing that was for them. So, I did feel a lot of  responsibility to make sure that
I was there. And being there also meant that I had to monitor all the comments
coming in so … I kind of  had to be actively there on my phone 24-7 really, which
meant that at 2 o’clock in the morning when I woke up to nurse my baby, that
I’m going through my phone to check the notifications to check comments and
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make sure that they're okay and to make sure that the page is okay and nothing’s
been attacked, it hasn’t been – nothing you know happened to it. Because [until
I drafted some friends in to help me] it was just me doing it and I really didn’t
want any person who shared their story to wake up in the morning and see
horrible comments. I wanted to protect them from that because … they shared
so vulnerably and beautifully with me. So yeah, I lived on my phone constantly.
Despite the work done to care for those who speak, there is, of  course a feminist dilemma
here, not only for the use of  stories that people never intended to tell, but also in the idea
that narratives and stories must be retold as a condition of  women being listened to. In
this process there is a risk that women become exploited, commodified and sacrificed.
Erin D’Arcy was aware of  this:
[W]e shouldn’t have to use their stories only to be able to get a law for ourselves
… I don’t know if  law-makers are understanding that, that we shouldn’t have to
have Savita [Halappanavar’s] name and her face on something for her to be able
to get the care she needs. We shouldn’t even know her name. 
Negotiating effectively with law-making institutions involves certain compromises.86 As
Reva Siegel has argued,87 in order to influence legal change social movements may be
required to conform to the ‘public value condition’, framing their demands in a discourse
that resonates with notionally shared cultural norms. This is a political move, which is
inevitably shaped by dominant power relations in society.88 In their narrative production
work activists may also internalise, or at least bargain with, some of  the bureaucratic or
procedural constraints of  legal institutions or media,89 with important consequences for
advocacy. As Ailbhe Smyth commented:
[O]bviously there is a selection process and that in itself  also raises ethical
questions. Of  course it does. Because you are either explicitly or implicitly
thinking about stories which will actually carry the kind of  impact and weight and
meaning and emotion and message that you want them to carry.
Curating narratives in this way has important disadvantages; as Davina Cooper notes, it
may silence non-hegemonic voices and risk conflict and division which will require labour
to avoid or repair.90 The risks and problematic practices involved must be weighed up by
the feminist activist alongside the desire to maintain a feminist perspective and voice in
public debate, especially in the media. As Ailbhe Smyth says of  the media, ‘if  you don’t
give them something, they will go and get it somewhere else’. These are difficult
judgements in feminist law work, and these appear as a central part of  managing narrative
as an important but risk-infused tool. 
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5.3 LABOUR
Feminist law work, of  course, involves labour, little of  which is remunerated. Persistence
and a commitment to long-term activity towards change at individual and collective levels
are essential for feminist activists.91 Sometimes the labour that is undertaken is a slow
chipping away over time. In the Northern Irish context Sarah Ewart’s comments
demonstrate an awareness of  and a commitment to this kind of  persistence: ‘we’ll just
keep going until we try and get it changed. Five years later.’ At other times, however,
labour is not so demanding in terms of  its duration but, rather, in its intensity. This was
particularly evident from those involved in the referendum campaign in Ireland. Linda
Kavanagh reflects on how this period stimulated a disorientating feeling for activists in
hindsight:
[I]t’s really obviously very nice to be on the other side of  that … it wasn’t that
long ago although time has no meaning for me anymore and it feels like decades.
The labour involved in feminist law work, furthermore, must be understood as evolving
over time. This evolution must be carefully reflected on and responded to strategically.
For example, at the time of  our workshop the challenge for those in Ireland was no
longer about mobilising support and canvassing for votes, but about motivating
supporters to continue in work to secure satisfactory legislative and healthcare
frameworks for abortion access on the ground. This required a shift in focus not only for
leaders, but for all in the movement, and there are attendant risks of  premature
demobilisation. As Linda says, this kind of  work is ‘not as sexy as getting out on the
street. It’s hard to keep people motivated.’
Throughout our discussions, the emotional toll of  this labour, and the demands made
on activists by its various forms and shifts were clear. This is not just physical labour,
although that is of  course involved too, but emotional labour.92 The idea of  ‘feminist law
work’ has the potential to bring into view the emotional life of  doing and engaging with
law as non-lawyers,93 a life that is often rendered invisible when we approach law and its
reform through more traditional lenses. Both Goretti Horgan and Linda Kavanagh
recalled incidents where they were moved to tears by the emotional toll of  the
unpredictable reform effort – a sudden victory or loss – or the stories of  women which
they were confronted with which stimulated an affective and empathetic response. Linda
Kavanagh describes her experience:
I was crying, you know, at my desk because another story had broken, like Miss Y
had broken or the woman in the coma94 and … feeling like it was never going
anywhere.
Activists also expressed a variety of  other emotions attached to their labour, including
dissatisfaction and frustration. As Emma Campbell says of  Alliance for Choice, ‘we’re just
used to always being dissatisfied’. This distinct emotional experience can set activists apart
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from their wider families and communities. Linda Kavanagh remembered an illustrative
incident in the period after the Repeal referendum victory:
Actually, funnily enough, I was at a funeral a while ago and somebody said … we
ended up talking about the referendum and somebody was kind of  asking what
I was doing now. And I was like, I’m taking it a bit easy, it took a lot of  out me.
And they’re like, ‘Yeah, 64% [the total Yes vote in the referendum] must be really,
really difficult to deal with’. Like really sarcastically. And I was just like, oh, you
don’t get it. At all. So, the layperson, that is how they will perceive it. They will
perceive it as it was nice. It was tough but it was nice in the end, so we’re all fine.
For those who have been personally affected by the law, there is a particular emotion
involved in their labour which must be recognised. Jane Christie explains the difference
simply: ‘We’re living it. And I think that impacts more.’
While our participants clearly evidenced the demanding and emotional nature of  their
labour, they also spoke of  what sustains them in this work. Often the work is enabled by
the relational bonds of  their movements,95 and the small moments of  progress that they
can detect. Again, Linda Kavanagh captured this:
I suppose the thing possibly that keeps you doing is your community, you know,
the other activists, and then sometimes it’s really weird, the small things … you
kind of  sometimes take your victories where you can … you kind of  have to take
them where you can, because it can seem so long and it can be so dark … you
don’t get a lot of  May 26ths.
Conclusion
In this account we have drawn attention to and named feminist legal work as an important
form of  activity at the heart of  legal change processes; one that is often under-considered
or rendered invisible by dominant reform narratives. Feminist activists are an often
overlooked or invisible part of  the plural, non-linear and contingent journeys towards
abortion law reform in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. They are not the whole story
of  reform, but their work is an important part of  it. In drawing attention to these non-
legal actors, we have not sought conclusively to define, delineate or deconstruct feminist
law work, but to offer a sense – from our engagement with eight activists – of  the variety,
challenges, skills and indispensability of  feminist law work to formal processes of
abortion law reform in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Thinking about this manifold,
instrumental, creative, emotional and laborious activity as work which is equally important
as that undertaken by legislators, lawmakers, judges, and other legal arbitrators offers an
additional thread to reflections on the Northern/Irish journeys towards legal change in
this area. 
More than just a way of  making sense of  how commitments to change the law were
achieved, drawing attention to this work and naming it also holds potential to assist us in
understanding the current legal landscape and ongoing activity on abortion law in both
jurisdictions. The feminist law work continues even as formal law reform is achieved: it is
an ongoing part of  shaping new legislation, of  publicising legal failure, of  highlighting the
gaps between law and practice, of  insisting on a richer conception of  reproductive justice,
and in subverting, playing at the edges of, ‘being cheeky’96 towards, and ‘tickling’ (Emma
Campbell) law. 
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For us as feminist legal scholars, the activists who undertake this work are a vital
reminder that it is possible, and necessary, to reimagine law and what is involved in formal
legal change processes. They encourage us to consider again (and again) how we
understand the limits and excesses of  law and the forms of  legal knowledge and skills that
we value, and to insist on inclusive understandings of  what it means to engage with and
‘do’ law in everyday life. 
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